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Countless decentralized finance (DeFi) 
applications of the past years have suffered from the 
high volatility and speculative behavior surrounding 
their underlying crypto assets. While the academic 
debate has been flourishing in these areas, 
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) 
have not received as much attention. This is the case 
even though they could offer an opportunity to solve 
some of the underlying problems of existing 
cryptocurrencies and ecosystems, for example, by 
providing lower volatility and, thus, exchange rate 
stability. This paper presents an economic analysis of 
the MakerDAO, a DAO in DeFi. In doing so, we use a 
single case study methodology based on existing 
resources and expert interviews. It also uses monetary 
theory instruments to provide researchers and 
developers with insights into how DAOs are governed. 
Further, it serves to illustrate how IS research may 
support the development of future IT artifacts aimed at 
offering the infrastructure for DeFi applications. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
On January 3rd, 2009, the first Bitcoin block ever 
created contained a direct reference to an article 
published on that very day in The Times, reading 
“Chancellor on the brink of second bailout for banks” 
[1, 2]. While there is a discussion within the 
blockchain community on the question of whether the 
creation of the Bitcoin currency was a direct result of 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009, it stands to reason 
that distrust in financial intermediaries advanced 
Bitcoin’s adoption. However, by the end of 2017, the 
native currency on the Bitcoin ledger increasingly 
turned into a speculative asset with high volatility [3]. 
Rather than becoming an alternative to traditional 
currencies, price fluctuations made it difficult to use 
Bitcoin as a medium of exchange [4].  
Since then, over a decade has passed, and Bitcoin 
and other major cryptocurrencies such as Ether and 
XRP remain volatile, hence, inherently risky assets 
unfit for use as a means of payment [5]. Therefore, 
both researchers and practitioners recently began 
working on cryptography-based decentralized 
ecosystems that would use the underlying technology 
of the Bitcoin currency, namely blockchain, as the 
foundation for decentralized financial (DeFi) services. 
According to Chen [6] and Amler et al. [7], these DeFi 
services have the potential to enable entirely new 
business models and fundamentally transform modern 
finance, potentially reducing transaction costs, 
improving access to financial services, and lowering 
barriers to investment for entrepreneurs [8, 9].  
However, the practical implementation of DeFi 
services relies on relatively stable cryptocurrencies 
that discourage short-term speculative behavior, 
enabling their productive use as a means of payment. 
One of the proposed solutions for high volatility in 
cryptocurrencies has been to implement stablecoins 
that aim to maintain a soft peg with real-world assets, 
such as fiat currencies, commodities, indices, or any 
combinations thereof [10]. Several stablecoins have 
already been implemented, successfully attracted 
considerable amounts of money, and are also used as 
a means of payment in countries suffering from high 
inflation and lack of political stability [11].  
As of June 15th 2021, the stablecoin market is 
estimated to have a 110-billion-dollar capitalization, 
with Tether, USDCoin, Binance USD, and Dai 
claiming almost 90 percent of that market [12]. Hence, 
they are considered the dominant implementations of 







the concept of stablecoins, and as of June 15th 2021, 
the equivalent of more than 5 billion US dollars have 
been locked in Dai [12]. MakerDAO, considered to 
provide one of the advanced and prominent DeFi 
ecosystems, aims to use overcollateralization to 
generate said Dai stablecoin that may address many of 
the theoretical and practical challenges that other 
stablecoins have suffered from. As such, it could 
become an option for decentralized banking and is 
thus relevant to any organizations and individuals 
currently acting in a centralized financial system [13, 
14]. However, from both a research and central bank 
perspective, MakerDAO opens the door to uncharted 
terrain in the analysis of IS and monetary theory. 
However,, there is little literature on MakerDAO. 
We aim at addressing this research gap by gaining and 
providing an in-depth and interdisciplinary 
understanding of fiat-pegged stablecoins in general 
and the MakerDAO ecosystem in specific. This lack 
of existing literature may result in risks for  researchers 
and practitioners. We resolve this by offering novel 
and relevant insights in DeFi and central banking.  
In doing so, our goal is threefold, as we want to 
(1) create a foundation for future research in DeFi, 
stablecoins, and the MakerDAO ecosystem by 
collecting and consolidating previously unstructured 
resources, (2) advance the theoretical understanding of 
the real-world applications of blockchain technologies 
in IS research, as well as (3) foster the academic 
exchange between researchers in IS and monetary 
theory to avoid past mistakes and increase the viability 
of these IT artifacts. 
Following the single case study approach of Yin 
[15], we will extend the existing research in 
blockchain-related systems science and monetary 
theory. By building on existing IS research, this paper 
refers to academic insights into blockchain, DeFi, and 
stablecoins. The theoretical background of this paper 
will be based on the monetary regimes surrounding the 
interwar gold exchange standards and the Bretton 
Woods financial system [16], as this time in economic 
history shares several key similarities with the ongoing 
challenges in DeFi. Consequently, we address a 
revelatory case that may serve as an interdisciplinary 
foundation for future longitudinal analysis of the 
MakerDAO ecosystem but also investigates a typical 
case as MakerDAO is currently the prominent 
representative of DeFi by total value locked [17]. 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1 Economics and monetary policy 
To motivate and understand the reasons for the 
popularity of cryptocurrencies and the need for 
exchange rate stability in monetary systems, this 
section provides an overview of the Bretton Woods 
system, its aims and prerequisites, its mechanisms, and 
execution, as well as its collapse and learnings.  
As a result of World War II and the abrupt halting 
of production for the war, the international system of 
trade and commerce had taken a significant hit, and 
trust between many developed nations was severely 
damaged [18]. During this time, currencies across the 
developed world were highly volatile [19], and trade 
between nations became unsustainably costly as there 
was a high level of currency and exchange rate risk 
involved in any transactions with other nations [20]. 
Economists and heads of state alike knew that both 
citizens and organizations require stable currencies 
and exchange rates if trade between nations was to 
take place again. Hence, delegates from all Allied 
countries convened for the United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference at the Mount Washington 
Hotel for the Bretton Woods Conference [21]. 
This conference aimed to establish an 
international exchange rate system that would 
facilitate trade among all participating nations by 
reducing the risk caused by the high volatility of 
exchange rates [22]. There were two competing 
proposals for how the system of international trade 
could be designed [23]. The American proposal, also 
known as the White-Plan, was built on quota-based 
funds in which international accounts would be 
balanced using special drawing rights [24]. Under this 
plan, the entire international trade system was based 
on the US dollar, which in turn rested on the gold 
standard under which the US dollar was fully backed 
by gold, and both assets could be freely exchanged by 
individuals, organizations, and governments [25]. For 
about three decades, this system was able to reduce 
exchange rate risks but ultimately collapsed after the 
US government abolished the gold standard, officially 
turning the US dollar into a fiat currency [26]. 
Specifically, this time was shaped by uncertain 
political environments, high volatility, and exchange 
rate instabilities [27, 28]. Furthermore, many of the 
motivators for financial reform are comparable with 
the post-War economic environment on both sides of 
the Atlantic, considering an unstable international 
trade system, high exchange rate risks and the 
prisoner’s dilemma involved in making free trade a 
welfare-optimizing strategy choice [29]. 
The Bretton Woods system was a fixed exchange 
rate regime in which several currencies were pegged 
to the US dollar, and the US dollar was backed by gold 
held in US reserves. The consequences of the failure 
of this system ultimately led to numerous advances in 
research of monetary theory but has not yet entered the 




aiming to achieve equivalent or similar goals. We 
expect that some of the problems surrounding early 
cryptocurrencies could be avoided if developers, 
organizations, and end-users had learned from past 
challenges and failures of centralized banking. Thus, 
the Bretton Woods system serves as a promising 
object of comparison for the analysis of the 
MakerDAO ecosystem, as it was established to reduce 
currency and exchange rate risks on markets with 
multiple, non-trusting actors over prolonged periods. 
2.2 Blockchain, DeFi, and stablecoins 
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto published their 
whitepaper ’Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System,’ which laid the foundation for the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin [30]. While Bitcoin itself was 
initially considered revolutionary, researchers soon 
focused on its underlying technology: the blockchain, 
which enabled business models and processes that 
went far beyond their use as an infrastructure 
technology for a decentralized currency [31, 32]. 
While Bitcoin has previously been referred to as the 
new gold [33], some researchers claimed that Bitcoin 
de facto lacks an intrinsic value [3]. Klein et al. [33] 
also found that Bitcoin behaves asymmetrically to 
many primary precious metals, despite the energy 
required to mine Bitcoin or execute transactions [34]. 
Building on the ideas of Nakamoto, open-source 
developers, foundations, and companies soon moved 
into the development of alternative cryptocurrencies, 
making various cryptocurrency implementations 
available to the public. The Swiss-based Ethereum 
Foundation developed the Ethereum network, 
allowing users to execute program code (smart 
contracts) implemented on the blockchain [35]. In the 
beginning, smart contracts were primarily used to 
replicate real-world assets, processes, and contracts on 
the blockchain. Use cases during the initial stages 
included, among others, supply chain management 
[36], voting mechanisms or systems [37], and cross-
border payments [38]. Recently, it opened the field of 
DeFi for academic research and practical application. 
According to Zetzsche et al. [39], DeFi may be 
defined by its incorporation of decentralization, 
distributed ledgers, smart contacts, disintermediation, 
and open banking. As such, it stands in contrast to both 
traditional finance and centralized banking as it could 
allow for a democratization of finance and monetary 
policy by broadening the opportunities for access, 
removing potential gatekeepers, and placing 
responsibility for policy decisions in the hands of the 
system’s actual users [40, 41]. Thereby, DeFi is 
increasingly relevant for areas such as international 
development, reserve banking, political governance, 
and business applications [9, 42, 43].  
However, one of the main problems of early 
examples of DeFi was that their underlying 
cryptocurrencies often suffered from high volatility 
and exchange rate risks [44]. Consequently, they were 
attractive to speculative investors but fell short of their 
promise to create an infrastructure for decentralized 
banking. Considering this problem in the productive 
implementation of decentralized monetary systems, 
developers turned their attention to developing 
cryptocurrencies that are less attractive as speculative 
assets and would maintain a certain amount of internal 
and external stability. 
These considerations resulted in the development 
of stablecoins. Despite their potential to drive 
innovations in developed financial systems, one of the 
impactful uses of DeFi services will likely occur in 
regions where significant numbers of people are either 
unbanked or underbanked [45]. In those regions 
specifically, DeFi could enable a decentralized 
monetary system independent from the influence of 
non-competitive actors and speculative shareholders. 
Stablecoins are “crypto-native assets that are 
stable in value and maintain a stable rate of exchange” 
[46, p. 1]. Recently, Lipton et al. defined them as “a 
digital unit of value with the following properties: (i) 
It is not a form of currency, (ii) it can be used without 
any direct interaction with the issuer, (iii) it is tradable 
on a secondary market and has a low price volatility in 
terms of a target quote currency” [47, p. 5].  
Gu et al. [46] broadly categorize stablecoins based 
on whether they are collateralized on or off the ledger. 
Nevertheless, further differentiations are possible 
concerning (i) the type and amount of the collateral, 
(ii) the stabilization or governance mechanisms, (iii) 
the price information provider, and (iv) the asset that 
the respective stablecoin is pegged to [10]. 
First, concerning the type and amount of 
collateral, different implementations of stablecoins 
may choose to hold a full reserve or partial reserve; 
they may also overcollateralize or avoid 
collateralization entirely. If they opt for 
collateralization, they may hold reserves of existing 
fiat money, tokenized commodities, cryptocurrencies, 
or a combination thereof. Second, they have the option 
of choosing a mechanism or use case such as a reserve 
of backed assets, a dual coin, an algorithm, or 
leveraged loans. Third, they may select oracles, voting 
systems, or trades to govern price information. Forth, 
they may be pegged to a fiat currency, tokenized 
commodity, an index, or combination thereof [10]. Dai 
serves as the stablecoin for the DeFi application 
MakerDAO. It is based on the Ethereum blockchain, 




Additionally, it uses leveraged loans and median 
oracles to adjust prices and supply.  
While Tether and the USD Coin are partially 
collateralized, the MakerDAO ecosystem features an 
over-collateralization mechanism [10]. Due to these 
features, MakerDAO is one of the widely adopted 
DeFi protocols [12], making an analysis of the 
ecosystem critical and revelatory. However, prior to 
this analysis, it is important to first define DAOs. 
2.3 Decentralized autonomous organizations  
There are two fundamentally different schools of 
thought in the governance of blockchains and 
blockchain-based applications: a techno-determinist 
one and a critical one [48, 49], with little room in 
between. While the techno-determinist view is market-
driven and might fail to spot and adapt to the real-
world requirement of social organizations, the critical 
view tends to recognize these requirements but 
primarily focuses on centralized institutions and how 
they could solve these downsides [49]. Consequently, 
there is no universally accepted definition of what 
constitutes a DAO but rather several broadly 
recognized definitions that share a hand full of mutual 
elements. From the perspective of the blockchain 
community, the definitions by Luis Cuende [50] and 
Vitalik Buterin [51] are the prominent ones, while 
academic researchers have recently converged upon 
the definitions by Jentzsch [52] and Chohan [53]. 
According to Cuende, “A DAO is an internet-
native entity with no central management which is 
regulated by a set of automatically enforceable rules 
on a public blockchain, and whose goal is to take a life 
of its own and incentivize people to achieve a shared 
mission.” [50] Buterin argued in 2013 that a DAO is 
“a virtual entity that has a certain set of members or 
shareholders which […] have the right to spend the 
entity’s funds and modify its code.” Jentzsch [52, p. 1] 
proposed that DAOs are “organizations in which (i) 
participants maintain direct real-time control of 
contributed funds and (ii) governance rules are 
formalized, automated and enforced using software,” 
while Chohan argues that “a DAO, is an organization 
that is run through rules encoded as computer 
programs called ‘smart contracts.’” [53, p. 1] 
However, the latest discussion on the definition of 
DAOs, to date, has been authored by Hassan and De 
Filippi: “A DAO is a blockchain-based system that 
enables people to coordinate and govern themselves 
mediated by a set of self-executing rules deployed on 
a public blockchain, and whose governance is 
decentralized (i.e., independent from central 
control).” [54, p. 1] After defining DAOs as such, we 
identified the method as well as the data collection. 
3. Method and data collection 
Over the past decade, researchers have been 
primarily interested in understanding blockchain itself 
and the potential areas in which it may be productively 
used [35, 43]. As a result, they have designed and 
evaluated IT artifacts, conceptualized potential use 
cases, and discussed the effects blockchain might have 
on organizations and individuals [55]. This paper 
builds on these insights in order to analyze the 
MakerDAO ecosystem using a single case study, 
following the recommendations by Yin [15], which 
will be complemented by insights into case study 
research in the context of blockchain applications, 
such as those identified by Treiblmaier [56]. 
The primary object of investigation in this single 
case study is the MakerDAO ecosystem as an example 
of a DeFi-based IT artifact. While blockchain-based 
cryptocurrencies have been around for over a decade 
now, their real-world applicability has been limited 
due to the involved risks and speculation [57]. By 
recognizing some of the obstacles that previous 
monetary regimes have faced and how they were 
overcome, researchers and developers in IS research 
can further improve existing DAOs and DeFi systems.  
Following the research process for single case 
studies as proposed by Yin [15] and applied under 
similar circumstances by Miscione et al. [58], we 
planned, designed, prepared, collected, analyzed, and 
shared their ideas, framework, and results. 
Consequently, our research is based on MakerDAOs 
documentation, forums, developer boards, as well as 
implemented and proposed code snippets. A list of 
sources used for this study may be found in Table 1. 
Based on the information gathered during this 
analysis of existing resources on MakerDAO and 
research on the Bretton Woods system, central 
properties of the MakerDAO ecosystem and the 
Bretton Woods system are derived and compared. The 
resulting monetary standards and comparisons are 
then validated using expert interviews with individuals 
highly knowledgeable in the fields of DeFi and DAOs, 
as well as economics and monetary theory. 
As per usual in exploratory and qualitative 
research, we use the information available in a variety 
of different sources [56, 57] to accurately understand 
the ever-evolving MakerDAO ecosystem and its 
internal debates and future directions development. 
This includes information available via Scopus, the 
Web of Science, and Google Scholar using 
‘MakerDAO,’ ‘Dai,’ and ‘decentralized autonomous 
organization’ as central search queries. We also rely 
on the available literature on the Bretton Woods 
monetary regime in general, the gold coin, the gold 




Following this review of the existing literature, 
we individually and independently analyzed the 
sources presented in Table 1. The information 
gathered there was then supplemented with the 
previously mentioned secondary sources covering the 
MakerDAO ecosystem from an academic perspective. 
Many of these papers were theory-, development-, or 
governance-oriented and failed to draw direct links to 
potentially similar economic and monetary regimes in 
the past and present. Additionally, the literature also 
provided insights into the economic and monetary 
policy during and after the Bretton Woods era. 
 
Table 1. Sources and resources 
MakerDAO Whitepaper [59] 15 pages 
MakerDAO Documentation [60] 423 pages 
MakerDAO 101 [61] 68 pages 
MakerDAO Developer Guides [62]  398 pages 
MakerDAO FAQ (legacy) [63] 109 pages 
MakerDAO Forum [64] 50 pages 
 
In a second step, we entered an exchange phase in 
which we discussed, evaluated, and structured the 
results from our independent research. In doing so, we 
constructed a framework in which we compared the 
MakerDAO ecosystem with the gold bullion standard 
and the gold exchange standard using seven specific 
dimensions within the two groups of governance and 
value. Based on this, they were able to evaluate which 
of the seven dimensions in the MakerDAO ecosystem 
closely matched the different standards. 
The results up to this point were then presented 
during a research colloquium with about a dozen 
researchers in business and IS, including blockchain 
researchers, thereby receiving first constructive 
feedback on the results. This feedback was then 
integrated into the overall framework, which was 
consequently adapted. Using semi-structured 
interviews with additional experts in both DeFi and 
economics, we then iteratively adjusted and improved 
the initial artifact. Our sample of experts represented a 
wide range of topics in DLT, Blockchain, and 
economics, such as DeFi, traditional public finance, 
and monetary theory, with relevant experience 
between two and six years. A condensed overview of 
the experts is presented in Table 2.  
The interviews consisted of an opening, an 
informed consent disclaimer, a discussion of the 
interviewees’ work history, the presentation of our 
research results, the evaluation of our research results, 
and the closure of the interview itself. Further 
information on our research process, including the 
structure of the interviews and the central insights 
gathered are listed in the online appendix [65]. 
Table 2. Condensed overview of experts 
 Background Field Relev. Experience 
1 DLT & DeFi Research 3 years 
2 DLT & DeFi Industry 2 years 
3 DLT Industry 2 years 
4 Economics Research 3 years 
5 Economics Research 6 years 
6 Economics Industry 4 years 
 
 This process aimed to refine our understanding of 
the MakerDAO ecosystem, evaluate our illustration of 
the MakerDAO ecosystem, and evaluate our artifact to 
demonstrate the similarities of MakerDAO with other 
monetary regimes. It also allowed us to identify 
implications that a system such as MakerDAO could 
have in the areas of institutional governance, insurance 
economics, and taxation. However, an understanding 
of these implication relies on a detailed understanding 
of the MakerDAO ecosystem. 
4. The MakerDAO ecosystem 
The MakerDAO Foundation set out to create an 
unbiased global financial system that could improve 
both (decentralized) finance and monetary policy [59]. 
For this purpose, they implemented the stablecoin Dai, 
the governance token MKR, and a governance system 
to gain access to and manage the entire ecosystem 
without relying on intermediaries [59, 66]. 
Figure 1. Exchange rates between the 
US dollar, Dai, and its collateral vault 
 
Using complex smart contract structures [67] to 
enable the mechanism demonstrated in Figure 1, the 
stable coin Dai was created to maintain a constant 
exchange rate of X:X ≡ 1:1 to the US dollar, which it 
aims to achieve by relying on an over-collateralization 
with multiple different collaterals in a vault [59]. 
Once the collateralization rate of, i.e., 150% has 
been exceeded, a user may take out a Dai loan for the 




of the backing asset falls below the liquidation rate of, 
i.e., 150%, its underlying vault, and its contents will 
be liquidated [68]. Hence, users have been aiming for 
higher collateralization rates and collateral 
diversification to avoid an auction of their assets in 
case of significant market shocks and volatilities. Until 
recently, the system relied solely on Ether as collateral 
but has expanded to other cryptocurrencies. 
Multi-collateral vaults (MCVs are usually aimed 
at risk reduction via a portfolio diversification [69] 
and, in the case of MakerDAO, are currently 
undergoing further development. For collateral types 
to be added, they have to be proposed, evaluated, and 
approved by governance token (MKR) holders [70]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Agents and actors in the 
MakerDAO ecosystem based on [61] 
As shown in Figure 2, we discovered that the 
MakerDAO ecosystem consists of seven types of 
actors that may be categorized into three different 
groups: Users, Maintainers, and Governors. Users are 
either holders of Dai or owners of vaults. Maintainers 
may be developers, oracles, or keepers. Governors are 
either MKR holders or members of risk teams. These 
roles are either staffed by individuals, groups of 
individuals or machines, and are not mutually 
exclusive, meaning that a Dai holder could also be a 
vault owner, developer, and risk team member. 
The decision-making process in the MakerDAO 
ecosystem relies on the cooperation of risk teams and 
MKR holders. While the risk teams act primarily as 
advisors, the MKR holders can vote on any technical 
and non-technical changes within the ecosystem. 
While some changes are made regarding the off-chain 
environment, others concern the on-chain governance. 
Each MKR holder is able to propose a governance 
change by executing a proposal contract. MKR 
holders are then polled to ensure that a given proposal 
is viable. The proposal will either be accepted or 
denied depending on whether it receives a majority of 
MKR holder votes or not. According to the 
MakerDAO whitepaper [59], MKR holders may vote 
on adding to collateralization asset types, setting and 
adjusting risk parameters, setting the Dai Savings 
Rate, selecting oracle feeds, shutdown the ecosystem 
in case of emergency, or perform updates [71, 72].  
The MakerDAO ecosystem is governed via on- 
and off-chain mechanisms. The on-chain governance 
primarily concerns polls and executive votes in the 
Maker Forum’s voting list. While the former captures 
the community’s general attitude towards a draft 
proposal to create a consensus, the latter executes 
technical changes . On-chain governance is facilitated 
by three central smart contracts. Chief is a smart 
contract that allows MKR holders to select a primary 
contract to be executed using their voting privileges. 
A pause is a smart contract that allows MKR holders 
to enforce a delay in executing specific calls. A spell 
is a smart contract that may be utilized to set technical 
constraints such as system parameters. Also, off-chain 
governance refers to any discussions among 
community members outside of the on-chain 
mechanisms. Hence, off-chain governance consists 
primarily of forum signal threats, forum polls, and 
blog entries by the community. The primary challenge 
for the MakerDAO community lies in implementing 
the infrastructure for MCVs and further decentralizing 
the overall governance structure of its ecosystem. 




Nevertheless, the MakerDAO ecosystem does not 
solely rely on the stablecoin (Dai) and governance 
token (MKR), as well as its immediate operative actors 
but also on external actors and agents. Figure 3 aims 
to present and classify these additional internal and 
external stakeholders. It also indicates the areas of 
responsibility for the system and its stakeholders. 
5. Towards DAO-based currency systems 
A DAO-based currency system could contribute 
to solving some of the primary challenges of banking 
in the 21st century, as its strengths and opportunities 
could lie in its ability to form an infrastructure for 
financial inclusion, participation in investments, 
interoperability, and disintermediation [6]. 
Across the globe, it is estimated that around 1.7 
billion adults are unbanked, hence disconnecting them 
from the global financial markets [45]. Second, 
participation in investment could be made available to 
those same individuals and organizations that are 
currently unbanked, thus enabling them to incur debt 
to create value in the future. Third, it could lead to an 
increase in interoperability of cryptocurrencies and 
other assets. As oracle teams are developing price 
oracles for various assets, users can use several 
different collateralization types to take out a stablecoin 
loan. However, it is unlikely that blockchain-based 
organizations will replace existing centralized 
institutions such as central or commercial banks [73]. 
In the history of monetary policy, an evolution 
occurred that resulted in establishing a goods-
exchange economy, the gold coin standard, the gold 
bullion standard, the gold exchange standard, and a 
floating exchange rate. While previous research 
suggests similarities between Bitcoin and the gold coin 
standard [74, 75], and due to a limited supply and the 
fact that resources are required for mining it, there has 
been little research into whether DeFi applications 
could replicate further advances in monetary theory to 
create a decentralized global financial system that 
enables financial transactions with little to no 
speculation and volatility. 
 
 
Figure 4. Parallels between Bitcoin, 
MakerDAO, and the development of 
monetary regimes 
As shown in Figure 4, we argue that the 
MakerDAO ecosystem partially meets the 
configurations of the gold bullion standard and the 
gold exchange standard, thus allowing a comparison 
that places MakerDAO in between both standards. As 
free floating exchange rates are currently too volatile 
in DeFi, it also remains to be identified how future 
DeFi artifacts may enable them reliably. 
As illustrated on the left side of Table 3, there are 
two different categories of dimensions with four 
dimensions each. While the dimensions of 
stabilization, mechanism, backed by, and collateral 
fall into the value category, the dimensions of policy, 
primary actors, secondary actors, and decisions falls 
into the governance category. The two categories are 
closely intertwined as an improvement of the 
governance of a system increases its value, while an 
increase in a system’s value necessitates a better 
governance for the system to run more efficiently. 




Some of the relevant results of our interviews 
beyond those listed in Table 3 may be clustered in a 
total of three groups covering (i) the advantages of free 
floating interest rates, (ii) the potential broad about by 
a community-agreed upon pricing of non-fungibile 
tokens (NFTs) in modern taxation schemes, and (iii) 
the importance of the size of the overall system by 
value locked and active use. 
The gold exchange standard and a fixed exchange 
rate regime might be crucial in enabling different 
cryptocurrencies to converge towards each other, 
easing the risk of a future move towards floating 
exchange rates. However, as MakerDAO does not yet 
meet all theoretical requirements of the gold exchange 
rate standard, it will be unable to move towards 
floating exchange rates in the foreseeable future. 
Hence, future development efforts should focus on the 
eight dimensions indicated in Table 3, while also being 
aware of the implications that hold between them. 
Additionally, limitations may include the fact that 
there is limited oversight, limited powers for users, 
and a lack of insurance against a loss of assets within 
the network [44]. Because many centralized banking 
systems offer a deposit guarantee, this will keep more 
traditional investors from using MakerDAO as means 
of payment. This issue is further worsened since it 
would be precisely those traditional investors that 
could further stabilize the overall ecosystem [42]. 
Despite limitations, MakerDAO partially 
achieved its goals, which places it in the pole position 
regarding future advances towards the gold exchange 
standard and floating exchange rates. From the 
internal perspective, these achievements include 
(multi-asset) collateralization [59], (partial) 
decentralization [72], and lower volatility [12]. From 
the external perspective, MakerDAO was able to 
implement a comparatively stable cryptocurrency. 
6. Conclusion 
Our research contributes to IS researchers’ limited 
but growing practical understanding of DeFi, 
stablecoins, MakerDAO and their interdisciplinary 
conceptualization at the intersection of research in IS 
research and monetary theory. Additionally, we have 
contributed to advancing our disciplines’ theoretical 
understanding of the real-world applications of 
blockchain technologies and their challenges. Our 
analysis also enables practitioners and researchers to 
work on some of the shortcomings of MakerDAO 
compared to other monetary regimes. 
These shortcomings may be retrieved from the 
extent to which MakerDAO matched the gold 
exchange standard in the dimensions of stabilization, 
stability mechanism, backed by, and collateral. In the 
governance category, they may be retrieved from the 
dimensions of policy, primary actors, secondary 
actors, and decision-making processes. It is also 
crucial to consider the co-dependency of value and 
governance, because a better governance will improve 
the ecosystems’ overall value, which will necessitate 
an improved governance. 
We evaluated the MakerDAO ecosystem based on 
both literature and expert interviews and outlined the 
foundation for a disintermediated global financial 
system using the concept of a DAO. In addition, we 
classify the MakerDAO ecosystem and provide nine 
areas for future research in DeFi, enabling a better 
understanding of MakerDAO as phenomenon in DeFi. 
The practical limitations of our research are three-
fold as (1) there is very limited peer-revied research 
available on MakerDAO, (2) only a limited number of 
experts could be consulted, and (3) MakerDAO is a 
quickly evolving ecosystem in which information has 
a short-lived half-life. Therefore, research should also 
aim at improving insights into MakerDAO, consult 
additional experts in DeFi, and continue to observe the 
MakerDAO community to catch updates regarding its 
value- or governance-driving dimensions. 
Specifically, future research in DAO value should 
focus on the expansion of collateralization types to 
real-world assets such as NFTs as this might unlock 
future lines of research at the intersection of finance, 
taxation, and transparency. Furthermore, future 
research in DAO governance could focus on policy, as 
correctly setting a DAO’s policies could enable a more 
open, innovative, and democratic financial system. 
Outside of MakerDAO, we are aware that our 
framework will only be transferrable if the aims and at 
least part of the governance mechanisms of the object 
of comparison aligns with those of MakerDAO. If 
transferred to an entirely different DeFi application, 
we expect the dimensions in the field of value to 
change while the dimensions in the field of 
governance could be equally relevant. Lastly, the 
connection between value and governance will likely 
hold for other DeFi applications. 
As of now, MakerDAO does not appear to 
replicate the primary goals of a central bank, namely 
price stability, support of economic activity, and a 
reduction in unemployment, but provides a valuable 
step towards a more stable DeFi ecosystem. Once its 
collateral-backed stablecoin ecosystem has been able 
to replicate the gold exchange standard in a 
decentralized and economically sustainable manner, 
research may also focus on how cryptocurrencies 
could move, from a hard- or soft-peg to another 
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